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Gavels in the Nursery:
An Appellate Court Shuts Out Parents and
Physicians from Care Decisions
Kellie R. Lang, J.D., R.N.;* Steven Leuthner, MD., MA.; ° Arthur R.
Derse, M.D., J.D.***
I. INTRODUCTION
Are healthcare professionals required to provide life-sustaining medical
treatment regardless of prognosis, parental input, or professional standards?
Unfortunately for children, parents, and healthcare providers in the state of
Wisconsin, a recent court decision suggests that the answer is "yes." In
Montalvo v. Borkovec, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ("the Court")
applied the standard for the termination of treatment for incompetent adults
with court-appointed guardians to a claim alleging that a physician violated
Wisconsin's informed consent statute by performing life-saving
resuscitation measures on a prematurely-born infant.' The Court concluded
that the parents had no right to withhold life-sustaining medical treatment
2because the infant was not in a persistent vegetative state.
This paper is an analysis of the Montalvo decision. It examines the
Montalvo Court's informed consent analysis, reviews and distinguishes
prior Wisconsin Supreme Court cases, In re Guardianship of L. W.3 and In
re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna MF. ,4 and demonstrates
* Instructor, Center for the Study of Bioethics, Medical College of Wisconsin. The author
has been a community member of Columbia-St. Mary's Ethics Committee since September
1999; she was not a member of the Committee at the time of this case.
Associate Professor of Pediatrics and Bioethics, Medical College of Wisconsin.
*** Director of Medical and Legal Affairs and Associate Director, Center for the Study of
Bioethics; Director, Medical Humanities Program; and Professor of Bioethics and
Emergency Medicine, Medical College of Wisconsin.
1. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 653
N.W.2d 890 (Wis. 2002), and 538 U.S. 907 (2003).
2. Id. at419.
3. In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992).
4. In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis.
1997).
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that these prior cases do not apply to medical decision-making for children.
We argue that the emergency exception to the informed consent
requirement was sufficient to dismiss this claim. Our discussion also
critiques the Montalvo Court's application of the federal Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) and the Court's public policy
considerations as mandates for treatment. 5
A. Montalvo v. Borkovec: Facts and Procedural History
On November 21, 1996, Nancy Montalvo was admitted to St. Mary's
Hospital in Milwaukee, Wisconsin with a diagnosis of pre-term labor.6 An
ultrasound at the time of her admission showed that she was twenty-three
and 3/7 weeks pregnant; her unborn infant weighed 679 grams.7 An
informed consent agreement for a cesarean procedure was executed prior to
delivery of the infant. 8  When attempts to stop labor and prevent a
premature birth did not succeed, Dr. Terre Borkovec, an obstetrician,
performed a cesarean section.9 Subsequently, Dr. Brent W. Arnold, a
neonatologist, "successfully performed life-saving resuscitation measures"
on the infant, Emanuel.' 0
Three years later, Emanuel's parents filed a complaint against St. Mary's
Hospital and the three physicians involved in their son's premature
delivery.1 This discussion focuses on the second claim of the case, which
alleged that the defendants violated Wisconsin's informed consent statute
when they performed "life-saving measures" on Emanuel. 12 The trial court
dismissed this claim, ruling that "Wisconsin law does not leave the
resuscitation decision upon the birth of a child solely to the parents because
5. The authors in no way endorse or support the claims or positions of the parents and
their attorneys in this case. Although we agree with the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin that
the claim was properly dismissed, we disagree with the Court's rationale for doing so.
6. Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d at 415-16.
7. Id. at 416.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. The plaintiffs' complaint consisted of two claims. The first claim alleged
that Dr. Terre Borkovec and Dr. Brent W. Arnold violated Wisconsin's informed consent
statute in performing the cesarean section procedure, which the trial court dismissed. This
first claim was not contested on appeal. The second claim alleged that Dr. Arnold, Dr.
Jonathan H. Berkoff, and St. Mary's Hospital negligently violated the informed consent
statute when they performed "life-saving measures" on Emanuel. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal of St. Mary's Hospital because the statute places an obligation on
physicians, not hospitals, to obtain a patient's informed consent. This article focuses on the
second claim related to informed consent and Emanuel's resuscitation. See id. at 416, 418.
12. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413,416 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
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of the community's interest in protecting children, and the physicians'
commitment to preserving life."'
13
B. The Wisconsin Court ofAppeals' Holding and Rationale
According to the Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs claimed that because
the physicians did not advise them "of 'the risks or potential consequences
of a child born at [twenty-three] or [twenty-four] weeks gestation and/or
with a birth weight of less than 750 grams,' consent was not informed and a
;iariety of damages resulted."' 4  The Court of Appeals noted that the
plaintiffs were not alleging harm to Emanuel as a result of "extraordinary
care measures."' 5 Instead, the plaintiffs claimed that it should have been
their decision as Emanuel's parents, rather than the physicians' decision,
regarding whether to use these "extraordinary care measures."' 6 The Court
also noted that the complaint did not allege that Emanuel was disabled due
to the defendants' actions.
1 7
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claim and
determined that the parents' informed consent was unnecessary.' 8 The
Court reasoned that no available and viable treatment alternatives existed to
trigger the obligation to engage in the informed consent process due to (1)
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in In re Edna M.F and (2) the
federal Child Abuse Protection and Treatment Act.19 The Appellate Court
also applied the emergency exception to the informed consent requirement
and provided public policy considerations in support of its dismissal.2°
II. ANALYSIS
A. Informed Consent
A logical look at the Court of Appeals' analysis of informed consent in
Montalvo suggests that the Court may have been confused about this
doctrine. On one hand, the Court rationalized that informed consent was
not necessary because there were no alternative treatment options available;
on the other hand, in applying the emergency exception to Wisconsin's
informed consent statute, the Court essentially presumed that informed
consent would have been necessary except for the exigent circumstances of
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413, 420-21 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
19. Id. at418-19.
20. See id. at 420-21.
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the case. The former assertion was an inaccurate interpretation of
Wisconsin's informed consent law, while the latter assertion was consistent
and applicable to the facts provided in Montalvo. The Court made the effort
to articulate the reasons why the informed consent requirement did not
apply, yet it had simultaneously agreed that the facts met the statutory
exception to the requirement. However, if the doctrine of informed consent
did not apply, then the exception was not necessary.
1. The Doctrine of Informed Consent in Wisconsin
The doctrine of informed consent developed out of a respect for
individual autonomy.2' Initially, physicians obtained informed consent
prior to touching or treating a patient in order to avoid charges of battery.2
As the doctrine evolved, physicians were required to disclose the risks of
non-treatment, as well as information about alternatives to the proposed
treatment.23  Today, lack of informed consent can lead to charges of
negligence or battery, depending on the jurisdiction.24 Wisconsin Statute
Section 448.30 codified the common law doctrine of informed consent in
Wisconsin: "Any physician who treats a patient shall inform the patient
about the availability of all alternate, viable medical modes of treatment and
about the benefits and risks of these treatments.
' 25
In Montalvo, the Court of Appeals interpreted Wisconsin Statute Section
448.30 to mean that informed consent is necessary only when there is more
than one single treatment alternative available: "Doubtless, the doctrine of
informed consent comes into play only when there is a need to make a
choice of available, viable alternatives. In other words, there must be a
choice that can be made., 26 The Court indicated that the presence of
treatment alternatives was the threshold for the informed consent
requirement and found that "[t]he second reason why a viable alternative
did not exist to trigger informed consent [was] the existence of the United
States Child Abuse Protection and Treatment Act .. ,27 Under the
Court's reasoning, informed consent is not required for diagnoses or
conditions where only one treatment currently is known or available, and
physicians may treat in those cases without informing the patient about the
21. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 356 (5th
ed. 2004).
22. Id. at 357.
23. Id. at 357-58.
24. Id. (noting further that some medical malpractice reform in the states have abrogated
battery as a theory in informed consent cases).
25. WIs. STAT. § 448.30 (2006).
26. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis
added).
27. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
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procedure or treatment and potential risks involved. Yet Wisconsin's well-
established informed consent law requires that information be provided to
the patient even if there is only one treatment alternative available.28 While
a physician is not required to inform a patient about treatment alternatives
that are not viable or not available,29 it does not follow that a lack of
alternatives negates the need to obtain a patient's informed consent prior to
treatment.
Past Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions have set forth the reasons why
informed consent is required regardless of whether there is more than one
treatment alternative available. 30  These cases demonstrate that the
underlying goal of the informed consent requirement is to provide
information to the patient. "The concept of informed consent is based on
the tenet that in order to make a rational and informed decision about
undergoing a particular treatment.., a patient has the right to know about
significant potential risks involved in the proposed treatment or surgery."
31
Additionally, "well-settled law provides that a physician, absent exigent
circumstances, may not perform a procedure on a competent adult without
consent." 32 The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not limit the requirement to
provide information only in those situations where multiple treatment
options were available.
The crux of the doctrine is to ensure that patients are well informed about
the procedure, or choice of procedures, prior to implementation. "In order
to insure that a patient can give an informed consent, a 'physician or
surgeon is under the duty to provide the patient with such information as
may be necessary under the circumstances then existing' to assess the
significant potential risks which the patient confronts. 33  This includes
information about alternative treatment options: "[Wisconsin Statute
Section 448.30] requires physicians to disclose information to patients
about the viable medical modes of treatment so that when the patient
chooses a method of treatment, that choice is made knowing both the
reasonable risks and benefits of her decision. 34 The information disclosed
may vary from case to case: "[W]hat a physician must disclose is
contingent upon what, under the circumstances of a given case, a reasonable
28. See Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (2006).
29. Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d at 418.
30. See generally, e.g., Johnson by Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 500-03 (Wis.
1996) (describing a series of Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions that developed the doctrine
of informed consent).
31. Id. at 501 (citing Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647, 652
(Wis. 1975)) (emphasis added).
32. Schrieber v. Physicians Ins., 588 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Wis. 1999).
33. Johnson, 545 N.W.2d at 501 (citing Scaria, 227 N.W.2d at 652).
34. Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 30-31 (emphasis added).
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person in the patient's position would need to know in order to make an
intelligent and informed decision." 35  Wisconsin law recognizes that
informed consent not only protects a patient's right to obtain information,
but also a patient's right to choose among medically viable treatments.
Informed consent was not required for the Montalvo infant's
resuscitation; this was not because of an absence of treatment options, but
rather because the circumstances were exigent.
2. Emergency Exception Applicable to Montalvo Facts
Common law and statute have recognized a longstanding emergency
exception to the informed consent requirement.36 As early as 1931, a court
determined that "if a surgeon is confronted with an emergency which
endangers the life or health of the patient, it is his duty to do that which the
occasion demands within the usual and customary practice ... without the
consent of the patient., 37  The prominent informed consent decision,
Canterbury v. Spence,38 also noted this exception. In that decision, a
federal court of appeals explained:
[A]s important as is the patient's right to know, it is greatly outweighed
by the magnitudinous circumstances giving rise to the privilege. The first
[exception] comes into play when the patient is unconscious or otherwise
incapable of consenting, and harm from a failure to treat is imminent and
outweighs any harm threatened by the proposed treatment.
39
The emergency exception to informed consent applies to treatment for
children and courts generally will allow a hospital's request to provide life-
saving treatment over parental refusal.40 The rationale for this emergency
exception is that the risk of harm in not providing treatment outweighs the
risk of harm in not obtaining informed consent.4 '
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the emergency exception in
Scaria v. St. Paul when it stated, "We do recognize there must be some
limitation upon the doctor's duty to disclose risks involved .... Likewise, a
doctor's duty to inform is further limited in cases of emergency or where
35. Johnson, 545 N.W.2d at 504-05 (noting that whether information is material to a
patient's decision and therefore requires disclosure is "rooted in the facts and circumstances
of the particular case").
36. FuRRow, supra note 21, at 409.
37. Jackovach v. Yocum, 237 N.W. 444,449 (Iowa 1931).
38. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
39. Id. at 788.
40. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 97 (9th ed. 1994).
41. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788-89.
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the patient is a child . ,,42 The Wisconsin legislature codified the
common law set forth in Scaria.43 The Wisconsin informed consent statute
provided for six exceptions, including emergencies. 44 "The physician's
duty to inform the patient under this section does not require disclosure
of... [i]nformation in emergencies where failure to provide treatment
would be more harmful to the patient than treatment.,
45
The emergency exception to Wisconsin's informed consent statute alone
justified dismissal of the Montalvo claim. The Court of Appeals wrote,
"The allegations suggest that an emergency arose requiring an immediate
response .... ,,46 Dr. Arnold performed life-saving resuscitation measures
on Emanuel after the cesarean procedure.47 According to the Court of
Appeals, these circumstances were "exigent. 48 Under the circumstances as
described, failing to provide treatment would have been more harmful to the
infant than the treatment itself.49 Again, the plaintiffs were not alleging
harm to their son as a result of the measures, described as "life-saving,"
performed by Dr. Arnold.50 In rationalizing why Dr. Arnold did not have to
engage in the informed consent process, the Court lost sight of the only
valid reason he did not have to do so- it was an emergency.
Although not raised as an issue in Montalvo, another component of
Wisconsin's informed consent common law considers reasonableness when
imposing a duty on a physician to obtain a patient's informed consent. 51
Under the common law, a doctor has a duty to make disclosures that appear
reasonably necessary under the circumstances to enable an individual to
intelligently exercise his or her right to consent.52 In Johnson by Adler v.
Kokemoor, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that the amount of
information that must be provided to the patient varies from case to case
and is governed by "what a reasonable person in the patient's position
would want to know."
53
It may be argued that by this objective standard, a mother, having
consented to a cesarean procedure in order to improve the chances of a live
(although premature) birth, would want her infant resuscitated if necessary.
42. Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Wis. 1975).
43. Johnson by Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 501 (Wis. 1996).
44. WIs. STAT. § 448.30 (5) (2006).
45. Id.
46. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413, 420 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 416.
51. Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647, 654 (Wis. 1975).
52. Id.
53. Johnson by Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 502-03 (Wis. 1996) (emphasis
added).
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Would a reasonable person consent to a cesarean procedure in order to
improve the chances of a live birth and healthy premature infant, but then
refuse to consent to the infant's resuscitation?
54
B. Misapplication of In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna
M.F.
The first reason the Appellate Court gave to explain why a viable
alternative did not exist to trigger the informed consent statute was the
existence of legal precedent in Wisconsin in the case of In re Guardianship
& Protective Placement Edna M.F.55 In re Edna M.F. was one of two prior
Wisconsin Supreme Court cases that addressed the issue of withholding and
withdrawing medical treatment for incompetent adults. The Supreme Court
in In re Edna M.F. specifically relied on In re Guardianship of L. W. in its
decision.56  Both In re L.W. and In re Edna MF. involved incompetent
adults with court-appointed guardians as decision-makers. Both of these
Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions made clear that their respective
holdings were limited to decisions made by these state actors.
Although the Wisconsin Appellate Court relied upon In re Edna M.F. in
Montalvo,57 its interpretation of In re Edna MF. was not an accurate
reflection of that decision. The In re Edna MF. decision was narrow and
applied to court-appointed guardians or "state actors," but the Montalvo
claim did not involve state actors.58 Absent judicial determination, parents
are not "court-appointed guardians" and children are not "incompetent
54. See generally, Dana Wechsler Linden & Mia Wechsler Doron, Eyes of Texas Fasten
on the Life, Death and the Premature Infant, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at F5. To consider
the question and rationale for litigation, compare this case with Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118
S.W.3d 758 (Tex. 2003) (reversing an award of $60 million at the trial level in 1998 to the
plaintiff parents, whose child suffered severe physical and mental impairments).
55. In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis.
1997).
56. Id. at 486.
57. The Montalvo court did not explain why it used In re Edna MF. rather than In re
L. W. as case law precedent. In re Edna ME. involved an incompetent person who had been
competent most of her life, and In re L. W. involved an incompetent person who had probably
never been competent. In re L. W. would seem to have been the more appropriate comparison
because decision-making for children is often compared to decision-making for those who
have never been competent. See generally Irene Hurst, The Legal Landscape at the
Threshold of Viability for Extremely Premature Infants: A Nursing Perspective, Part I, 19 J.
PERINATAL & NEONATAL NURSING 161, 165-66 (2005) ("The court in Montalvo did not
explain how the condition of a 71-year-old woman with dementia who had lived a full life
correlated with that of an infant on the threshold of viability for whom medical care options
would involve the uncertainty of risk, pain, and unknown consequences.").
58. See Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413,416 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
[Vol. 16
8
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol16/iss2/5
Gavels in the Nursery
wards." 59 Thus, the precedent derived from In re Edna M.F. cannot be
applied to Montalvo without providing a rationale for broadening the scope
of these former decisions.
In order to distinguish Montalvo from In re Edna M.F., we must first
examine In re L. W. The context and language of the In re L. W. and In re
Edna M.F. decisions are significant and contribute to a more thoughtful
understanding of Wisconsin's common law regarding treatment decision
issues.
1. In re Guardianship of L. W.
a. Facts and Procedural History
According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, L.W. was a seventy-nine-
year-old man with a history of undifferentiated schizophrenia who had been
institutionalized since 1951.60 In May of 1989, LE Phillips Career
Development Center (a not-for-profit corporation) was appointed as the
guardian of his person and his estate. 61 He had no close friends or relatives
and no one was aware of whether he had ever indicated his wishes
concerning life-sustaining medical treatment; the record also suggested that
L.W. may have never been competent.62 On May 31, 1989, L.W. suffered a
cardiac arrest and was taken to a hospital where physicians informed the
guardian that L.W. was in a persistent vegetative state.63 The physicians
indicated that if L.W.'s condition did not improve over the following
weeks, they would request that the guardian consent to withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration.64
"On June 8, 1989, the guardian petitioned the circuit court for a declaratory
judgment to determine whether [a] guardian had the authority to consent to
59. See, e.g., Stierman v. McPherson, 655 N.W.2d 487,493-94 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)
(indicating that a guardian may be appointed for incompetents or minors, and parents are not
court-appointed guardians).
60. In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Wis. 1992).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. at n. 1 (describing the characteristics of persistent vegetative state, in part as:
Irreversible loss of all neocortical functions; brain stem functions intact; awake but unaware;
eyes-open unconsciousness; sleep/wake cycles present; and respirator independence). See
generally The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent
Vegetative State - First of Two Parts, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499 (1994) (summarizing
current knowledge of the medical aspects of persistent vegetative states in adults and
children).
64. In re L. W., 482 N.W.2d at 63-64.
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such withdrawal. 6 5 The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem.6 6 The
trial court concluded that a guardian has the authority to consent to
withdrawal of all life-sustaining medical treatment if withdrawal is
determined by the guardian to be in the ward's best interests.67 The
guardian ad litem appealed the trial court's order and the guardian and
hospital cross-appealed.68
Although L.W. had died in February 1991, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
accepted the appeal for two issues: "Whether an incompetent individual in a
persistent vegetative state has a right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration, and whether a court-
appointed guardian may exercise that right on the ward's behalf."
69
b. Holding and Rationale
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re L. W. determined that incompetent
individuals have the right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining medical
treatment.70 The court stated that this right "emanates from the common
law right of self-determination and informed consent, the personal liberties
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and from the guarantee of liberty
in Article I, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution., 71 However, the court
held that a court-appointed guardian could only refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment on behalf of an incompetent ward when certain legal
safeguards are met, stating:
[A] guardian may consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical treatment on behalf of one who was never competent,
or a once competent person whose conduct never was of a kind from
which one could draw a reasonable inference upon which to make a
substituted judgment, when:
(1) [T]he incompetent patient's attending physician, together with two
independent neurologists or physicians, determine with reasonable
medical certainty that the patient is in a persistent vegetative state and has
no reasonable chance of recovery to a cognitive and sentient life; and
65. Id. at 64.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
70. In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 67 (Wis. 1992).
71. Id. at 65.
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(2) the guardian determines in good faith that the withholding or
withdrawal of treatment is in the ward's best interests, according to the
objective factors outlined below. 72
The court wrote that a best interests determination must begin with a
presumption that continued life is in the best interests of the ward.7 3 The In
re L. W. court provided a list of objective factors that a guardian may
consider in overcoming this presumption, including: (1) The degree of
humiliation, dependence, and loss of dignity probably resulting from the
condition and treatment; (2) the life expectancy and prognosis for recovery
with and without treatment; (3) the various treatment options; and (4) the
risks, side effects, and benefits of each of these options.74
c. Limitations of the In re L.W. Holding
In its discussion in In re L. W., the Wisconsin Supreme Court specified
that its holding was limited to state actors, 75 and that "[a]n incompetent is a
ward of the state and [Wisconsin's] parens patriae power requires [the]
court to ensure that the ward's best interests are protected. 76 The court
explained that "court appointed guardians fulfill the parens patriae duty of
the state to protect the best interests of an incompetent ward. 77 The court
further noted that "a guardian is a state actor ... [whose] authority derives
from the state's parens patriae power and is purely statutory.
7 8
A final and particularly significant distinction can be found in a footnote
where the Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically excluded from its holding
decisions involving family members:
We do not decide today whether a family member may consent to the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment from a
patient, because that question is not before us. Our review is limited to
whether a court appointed guardian, where there can be no familial
decisional process, may consent to the withholding or withdrawal of such
treatment from a patient in a persistent vegetative state.79
72. Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 72.
74. Id. at 72-73 (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (N.J. 1985)) (noting that the
guardian must assess these objective factors from the patient's standpoint as opposed to a
guardian's view of the patient's quality of life).
75. See id. at 71-72.
76. In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 68 (Wis. 1992).
77. Id. at 71.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 72 n.16. See generally Ardath A. Hamann, Family Surrogate Laws: A
Necessary Supplement to Living Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REv. 103
(1993) (proposing that families should have medical decision-making authority for
20071
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2. In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F.
a. Facts and Procedural History
When Ms. Edna M.F.'s appeal reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
January 1997, she was a seventy-one-year-old woman diagnosed with
Alzheimer's-type dementia. 80 She was able to breathe without assistance
but otherwise was immobile, bedridden with contracted limbs, and
dependent upon others for her care.8' She exhibited no purposeful response,
although her physicians indicated that she responded to voice or movement
stimulation and that she appeared alert at times with her eyes open.82 She
also responded to noxious stimuli. 83  She had a feeding tube surgically
inserted in 1988.84 Ms. M.F. lived and was cared for at the Marshfield
Nursing and Rehabilitation ("Marshfield").85 Her condition was not likely
to improve. 6
Justice Bablitch's concurring opinion noted that "[n]either of the two
physicians who examined Ms. [M.F.] were neurologists. The only doctor
who was asked his opinion on whether Ms. [M.F.] was in a persistent
vegetative [state], testified that she was not. 87 The concurrence noted that
this physician used an arguably outdated neurology definition from 1989 to
render this opinion.88
Ms. M.F. had a court appointed guardian who was also her sister, Ms.
Betty Spahn.89 Ms. Spahn sought permission to withhold Ms. M.F.'s
nutrition and claimed that her sister would not have wanted to live in this
incompetent persons and that courts should intervene only when a family's motivation is
questioned).
80. In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F, 563 N.W.2d 485, 487
(Wis. 1997).
81. Id. at 487, 492 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 487.
85. Id.
86. In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 487
(Wis. 1997).
87. Id. at 497 (Bablitch, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 487.
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manner. 90 Ms. Spahn testified at trial that Ms. M.F. once told her, "'I would
rather die of cancer than lose my mind."' 9 1 Their conversation had taken
place thirty years beforehand in a discussion about their mother, who was
recovering from depression, and Spahn's mother-in-law, who was dying of
cancer. 92 No other evidence or expressions of Ms. M.F.'s values or end-of-
life wishes were provided.93 Ms. Spahn testified that "this was the only
time that she and Edna discussed the subject and that Edna never said
anything specifically about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
medical treatment. 94
Marshfield's Ethics Committee met in October 1994 to consider whether
to comply with Ms. Spahn's request to withhold artificial nutrition for Ms.
M.F. 95 The committee approved the request on the condition that no family
member objected.96 The committee wanted to have each family member
sign a statement approving this withdrawal,9 7 but one of Ms. M.F.'s nieces
refused to sign.98 Ms. M.F.'s niece did not object to withholding nutrition,
but her religious views precluded her from consenting in writing.99 Ms.
Spahn then filed a petition with the circuit court as a guardian of an
incompetent person asking for the court's confirmation of her decision to
withhold nutrition from Ms. M.F.' ° The Wisconsin Supreme Court
accepted the case on bypass from the court of appeals.' 0 ' As Ms. M.F.'s
guardian and guardian ad litem both agreed and argued to withhold
nutrition, the Supreme Court appointed a separate attorney as "respondent-
designate" to argue for sustaining Ms. M.F.'s life.' 02
The In re Edna MF. case presented two issues for the Wisconsin
Supreme Court:
(1) Whether the guardian of an incompetent person who has not executed
an advance directive and is not in a persistent vegetative state has the
authority to direct withdrawal of life sustaining medical treatment from
the incompetent person; and (2) Whether in this case, notwithstanding
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 487
(Wis. 1997).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 487, 496 n.8 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
98. In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 487, 496
n.8 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (Wis. 1997).
99. Id. at 496 n.8 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
100. Id. at 487 (appointing a guardian ad litem and denying Spahn's petition).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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the fact that she is not in a persistent vegetative state, there is a clear
statement evidenced in the record of Edna's desire to die rather than have
extreme measures applied to sustain her life under circumstances such as
these.'03
b. Holding and Rationale
The Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically relied on and affirmed In re
L. W. in its holding.1 °4 It held that "a guardian may only direct the
withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment [] if the incompetent ward
is in a persistent vegetative state and the decision to withdraw" is in the
ward's best interests. 105 That court reasoned that Ms. M.F.'s statements to
her sister made thirty years earlier did not constitute a clear statement of
intent that served as a basis for the guardian to authorize the withholding of
her nutrition. 10 6 Finally, the court explicitly declined to extend the scope of
In re L. W. to incompetent wards with incurable or irreversible conditions,
holding that it only would authorize the withholding of life-sustaining
medical treatment when the patient is in a persistent vegetative state. 107
c. Discussion and Analysis
(1) Given the circumstances of In re Edna M.F., the Wisconsin
Supreme Court could not expand In re L. W.
At first glance, the description of Ms. M.F. provided by the majority and
concurring opinions might appear to justify granting the guardian's request
to withdraw treatment: Her physical condition had deteriorated, she was
mentally incompetent, her mental condition was declining, and her family
agreed that withdrawing treatment would be best for her.'0 8 Upon closer
inspection of the facts in this case, however, and recognizing that this
decision would serve as a template for future guardian requests to withdraw
treatment, the court's denial of the guardian's request and refusal to expand
In re L. W. under these circumstances was understandable. The rationale for
the court's decision had less to do with whether the right to discontinue
treatment exists for incompetent adults who are not in a persistent
103. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
104. In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485,486,
491-92 (Wis. 1997).
105. Id. at 486.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 491.
108. See id. at 487.
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vegetative state, and more to do with ensuring that the process that leads to
such requests provides for consistent and adequate protections or safeguards
for incompetent wards of the state.
The safeguards presumed present in treatment decisions involving
incompetent adults were missing or deficient in Ms. M.F.'s case. In
addition to the obvious safeguard of an accurate medical diagnosis, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court identified two others in its In re L. W. decision:
(1) The importance of ascertaining the patient's wishes; and (2) the use of
an ethics committee in the decision making process.'0 9 The process in In re
Edna MF. lacked those safeguards to ensure that the determination to
discontinue treatment was in Ms. M.F.'s best interests. The physician who
examined Ms. M.F. used an outdated neurological assessment standard to
determine whether she was in a persistent vegetative state. 110 The only
evidence of Ms. M.F.'s wishes or values consisted of a single statement she
had made thirty years prior."' Although the opinion identified that Ms.
M.F. was a Roman Catholic and her family loved her, there was no clear
evidence of Ms. M.F.'s personal values or objectives related to withdrawal
of nutrition. 112  Finally, the nursing home's ethics committee did not
function in an effective manner. 1 3 Chief Justice Abrahamson elaborated on
this factor in her concurring opinion and noted that the focus of the ethics
committee in Ms. M.F.'s case seemed to be on avoiding legal liability rather
than determining her best interests.' 14
The court's discussion of the slippery slope 15 illustrates its hesitancy to
give way to an undisciplined withdrawal of artificial nutrition. Although
Chief Justice Abrahamson indicated a willingness to give family more
leeway,1 6 and although In re L. W. clarified in a footnote that its holding did
not apply to family members, 1 7 Ms. Spahn never raised this issue as a
109. In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 70, 73-74 (Wis. 1992).
110. In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 497
(Bablitch, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 487.
112. Id.at 491.
113. Id. at 495-96 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (contrasting the nursing home's ethics
committee with In re L. W.'s favorable comments towards ethics committees and their
functions). The role of ethics committees is precisely to sort out these difficult issues and
conflicting ethical principles involved in withdrawal of treatment. See American Academy
of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics, Institutional Ethics Committees, 107 PEDIATRICS 295,
205-09 (2001) (detailing the roles of institutional ethics committee in clinical ethics).
114. In re Edna MF., 563 N.W.2d at 495-96 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
115. Id. at 490.
116. Id. at 494 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) ("It is a fundamental premise of L. W.
that ordinarily decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment of a ward
are to be made by a guardian in conjunction with doctors and the family, not by the courts.").
117. In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 72 n. 16 (Wis. 1992).
2007]
15
Lang et al.: Gavels in the Nursery: An Appellate Court Shuts out Parents and P
Published by LAW eCommons, 2007
Annals of Health Law
distinguishing factor in spite of the facts that Ms. Spahn was a sibling" 8 and
that all family members (except for one niece) agreed that discontinuing
nutrition was in Ms. M.F.'s best interest. 19
It is likely that the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that the In re
Edna MF. decision would have a greater impact for future cases involving
incompetent wards of the state and medical treatment, especially those
wards of the state without a prior familial relationship or friendship with
their court-appointed guardian. In situations where there is no family or
friend to care about an incompetent ward, process can serve as an additional
protection.
(2) In re Edna M.F. should not be applied to children
Until the Montalvo decision, it was unclear whether In re Edna M.F.
applied to children with parents as decision-makers. 120  Arguably, the
language chosen by the Wisconsin Supreme Court indicates that it did not
intend for In re Edna MF. to apply to children. The court consistently
articulated that its decision applied to incompetent wards and court-
appointed guardians or state actors. 12' The law distinguishes between
"children" and "incompetent wards" and between "parents" and "court-
appointed guardians"; these roles and definitions are not interchangeable. 122
Indeed, to interchange these terms within the law would render absurd
results. 123 Recall also that In re L. W., upon which In re Edna MF. relied,
specified that its decision was not applicable to situations where family
members sought to withhold or withdraw treatment. 1
24
118. InreEdnaMF.,563N.W.2dat487.
119. Id. at 496 n.8 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
120. Scott D. Obernberger, What About Children?, 8 HEALTH L. WIs., STATE BAR OF
Wis., Winter 1998, at 2-4.
121. See generally In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d at 485-501.
122. See generally In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60,71 & n.14 (Wis. 1992)
(explaining how a court determines a guardian's authority to make decisions for an
individual the courtfinds to be an incompetent ward).
123. For illustrations of how these terms are not fungible, substitute the italicized terms
with the bracketed terms in the following examples: See, e.g., Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584,
602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of
the family as a unit with broad parental [court-appointed guardian] authority over children
[incompetent wards]."); see also, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del.
1991) ("Parental [court-appointed guardian] autonomy to care for children [incompetent
wards] free from government interference therefore satisfies a child's [incompetent ward's]
need for continuity and thus ensures his or her psychological and physical well-being."); see
also, e.g., In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 180 (Wis. 1975) ("The
appellant, Janice Pescinski Lausier, on her own petition, was appointed guardian [parent] of
the person of her brother, the respondent, Richard Pescinski.").
124. InreL. W.,482N.W.2dat72n.16.
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It is troubling that the Montalvo Court appeared to ignore the context and
limitations of In re Edna M.F. when it paraphrased that decision: "It thus
concluded that either withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical
treatment is not in the best interests of any patient who is not in a persistent
vegetative state." 125 It is important to note that the In re Edna M.F. decision
did not include that sweeping language in its decision, but instead limited
its scope to medical decision-making for incompetent adults: "This brings
us to the situation at hand - whether this court should allow surrogate
decision makers to decide to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical
treatment from an incompetent adult who is not in a persistent vegetative
state."
126
Additionally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court limited the application of the
In re Edna M.F. decision to those under the formal protection of the state:
However, if that person is not in a persistent vegetative state, this court
has determined that, as a matter of law, it is not in the best interests of the
ward to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, including a feeding tube,
unless the ward has executed an advance directive or other statement
clearly indicating his or her desires. 127
Finally, in its conclusion, In re Edna M.F. reiterated that its holding was
limited to guardians and incompetent wards: "Consequently, we hold that a
guardian may only direct the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
treatment, including nutrition and hydration, if the incompetent ward is in a
persistent vegetative state and the decision to withdraw is in the best
interests of the ward."'
12 8
A "ward" is "a person, especially a child or incompetent, placed by the
court under the care and supervision of a guardian or conservator."' 1 9 In
order to qualify as a "ward," some sort of legal or judicial action is
required. 130  Similarly, judicial action is required to declare a person
"incompetent" or to appoint someone as a "guardian."' 13 1 Absent judicial
determination, children are not "wards" and parents are not "guardians."
132
Given these clear limitations provided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, In
125. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413, 419 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (citing In re
Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997))
(emphasis added).
126. In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d at 489 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 489-90 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 491-92 (emphasis added).
129. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1583 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 880.01 (10) (2006).
131. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 880.01 (3)-(4) (2006).
132. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 880.01 (10) (2006).
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re Edna M.F. cannot reasonably be applied to claims involving children
with parents as decision-makers.
(3) In re Edna M.F. affirmed the safeguards of In re L. W.
As shown from the discussion above, in relying on In re L. W., the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Edna MF. continued to allow a guardian
to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment on behalf of an incompetent
ward if the ward was in a persistent vegetative state and the decision to
withdraw was in the best interests of the ward. The Court of Appeals in
Montalvo interpreted In re Edna M.F. as setting a threshold for treatment
withdrawal in general: "[O]ur supreme court set forth the preconditions
required for permitting the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
medical treatment."'' 33 However, neither In re Edna M.F nor In re L. W.
actually set forth preconditions for permitting withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining medical treatment. Instead, these Wisconsin Supreme Court
decisions outlined affirmative criteria for guardians of incompetent adult
wards in making these treatment decisions.' 34 With In re L. W. and In re
Edna M.F, in Wisconsin, guardians of incompetent wards in a persistent
vegetative state may withdraw treatment if it is in the best interests of the
ward without obtaining a court order.135 Neither case precluded a guardian
from seeking such a court order to discontinue treatment under different
circumstances. Court orders sought on a case-by-case basis provide an
opportunity for judicial review, which serves as an additional safeguard for
incompetent wards of the state.
C. Misapplication of Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA) 136
Recall that the Appellate Court concluded that informed consent was not
required in Montalvo because there were no alternative treatments available
for the Montalvo infant.' 37 The court cited two reasons why no alternative
treatments existed. 38 The first reason, In re Edna M.F, has been discussed
above. The second reason that the Appellate Court gave to explain why no
viable alternative treatments existed (and thus to explain why the informed
consent statute did not apply) was because of the existence of the federal
133. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413,418 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
134. See generally In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F., 563
N.W.2d 485, 485-501 (Wis. 1997); see generally In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d
60, 60-79 (Wis. 1992).
135. In re Edna MF., 563 N.W.2d at 491-92; In re L. W., 482 N.W.2d at 75.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 5104 etseq. (2005).
137. Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d at 418.
138. Id.
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Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). 3 9 However, the
Court's application of CAPTA as a mandate for treatment does not
withstand closer scrutiny.
CAPTA has been described as a federal funding statute that conditions
each state's receipt of federal funding for child abuse prevention programs
on maintaining a procedure for responding to reports of neglect of
newborns. 140 The federal regulations relating to CAPTA require states to
establish programs and/or procedures within their Child Protective Service
(CPS) systems to respond to reports of "medical neglect, including
instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled
infants with life-threatening conditions (commonly known as 'Baby
Doe').' ' 141  Wisconsin has interpreted CAPTA in this way: "All states
receiving child abuse and neglect funds from the federal government must
have procedures for handling a report of possible medical neglect of an
infant in place."'
142
Thus, while CAPTA provides states with a powerful incentive to
establish programs of this nature, it actually does not require or mandate
treatment of premature infants. Furthermore, a report of suspected medical
neglect does not necessarily lead to actual charges of medical neglect.
CAPTA and its corresponding federal and state regulations set a trigger for
investigating reports of medical neglect; they are not proof positive that
medical neglect has, in fact, occurred.
143
Additionally, in its Guidelines in Handling a Report of Possible Medical
Neglect of a Disabled Infant (Baby Doe) ("Guidelines"), the Wisconsin
Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) goes to great lengths to
stress the primacy of the parent as decision-maker, as well as the
seriousness and individualized nature of the circumstances involved in any
charge of withholding medical treatment. 144  The Guidelines encourage
healthcare providers to respect parents' needs, feelings, and rights, and to
139. Id. at 419.
140. FURROW, supra note 21, at 1460.
141. DEP'T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERV. Div. OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERV., BUREAU OF
PROGRAMS & POLICY, GUIDELINES IN HANDLING A REPORT OF POSSIBLE MEDICAL NEGLECT
OF A DISABLED INFANT (BABY DOE) 1 (1996) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
142. Id. at 2.
143. There is disagreement among medical professionals regarding CAPTA's
application to extremely premature infants. See American Academy of Pediatrics,
Committee on Bioethics, Ethics and the Care of Critically Ill Infants and Children, 98
PEDIATRICS 149, 149-52 (1996) [hereinafter Critically Ill Infants]; Loretta M. Kopelman, Are
the 21-Year-Old Baby Doe Rules Misunderstood or Mistaken?, 115 PEDIATRICS 797, 797-
802 (2005); John A. Robertson, Extreme Prematurity and Parental Rights after Baby Doe,
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, July-Aug. 2004, at 32-39.
144. GUIDELINES, supra note 141, at 3, 7.
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assume that parents are loving and concerned guardians. 145 The Guidelines
acknowledge parents as decision-makers: "Parents have traditionally had
the legal right and obligation as well as the personal insight, concern, and
love to make decisions regarding the health and welfare of their children.
In the vast majority of instances, parents are the most enlightened and
thoughtful decision-makers for their children."' 146  The Guidelines also
suggest collaboration between parents and physicians when making a
decision:
Movement toward resolution of a Baby Doe case may occur if ... it is
ascertained that: .. .[T]he current level of medical treatment has been
reviewed by prudent physicians who are "knowledgeable about the case
and the treatment possibilities with respect to the medical conditions
involved" ... and is considered the appropriate treatment of choice by
the treating physicians and by the parent(s). 147
The Guidelines specifically recognize that this is a gray area and do not
draw a bright line for making these decisions.
The Guidelines support the use of many interdisciplinary resources,
including ethics committees, to resolve a case and encourage "[i]nformal,
nonjudicial resolution, if possible.' ' 148 Contrary to the Appellate Court's
interpretation, 149 CAPTA does not require that a premature infant be
resuscitated without regard for prognosis, parental input, or medical
standards.
Another point of confusion, though arguably minor, in the Appellate
Court's Montalvo analysis is its justification of the application of CAPTA:
"Because Wisconsin has fulfilled the necessary obligations to receive
federal funds under CAPTA, CAPTA and its regulations are fully
applicable in this state."' 150 First, an examination of the source cited by the
Court of Appeals, Jeanine B. v. Thompson, does not lead to this
conclusion.'15  Second, the burden is on the federal agency to determine
145. Id. at 7.
146. Id. at 8.
147. Id. at 22.
148. Id. at 10-12, 22.
149. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413, 419 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
150. Id. (citing Jeanine B. v. Thompson, 967 F.Supp. 1104, 1111-12, 1118 (E.D. Wis.
1997)).
151. See Jeanine B., 967 F. Supp. at 1104-12. The Montalvo interpretation of CAPTA
has been cited as "judicial validation of CAPTA's authority to severely limit the situations in
which physicians may permissibly withhold medical treatment." Sadath A. Sayeed, Baby
Doe Redux? The Department of Health and Human Services and the Born-Alive Infants
Protection Act of 2002: A Cautionary Note on Normative Neonatal Practice, 116
PEDIATRICS e576, e581 (2005).
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whether a state meets its funding criteria prior to disbursement. 5 2
Presumably, a state has met the federal funding criteria if it has received the
federal monies. Under CAPTA, state programs are not required to be the
same or uniform; state programs will vary. 53  "CAPTA grants states
flexibility in how they choose to 'provide that' investigations shall be
initiated."' 5 4  The question of whether Wisconsin qualified for federal
funding under CAPTA was not before the Appellate Court. 155
Finally, the Appellate Court provided no explanation of how CAPTA or
Wisconsin regulations pertaining to medical neglect would apply to the
specific facts in Montalvo.'56 No evidence was presented to demonstrate
that a report of medical neglect would have been made, an investigation
would have ensued, or actual charges would have been filed.
D. Wisconsin Court of Appeals' Public Policy Considerations in Montalvo
The Appellate Court in Montalvo provided three public policy reasons
for upholding the trial court's dismissal of the claim: (1) The interest in
preserving life; (2) concern for placing physicians in a "continuing damned
status"; and (3) concern for variations in parental determinations of which
disabilities are "worse than death."' 57 The Court's explanations for its
public policy reasons were vague and unconvincing. Ironically, a closer
examination of the Court's considerations supports the withdrawal and
withholding of medical treatment in some circumstances for children who
are not in a persistent vegetative state.
1. Preserving Life
The state has an interest in preserving life; however, regarding medical
treatment decisions, does the state have an interest in preserving life
without regard for potential or certain burdens of treatment and suffering
that may be imposed on a child? The Wisconsin Appellate Court appeared
to answer in the affirmative despite legal precedent to the contrary.
In its discussion of this initial public policy point, the Appellate Court
cited In re L. W 158 Yet the Court ignored the following guidance from the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in that same decision: "Moreover, we do not
view the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as depriving the patient of
152. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (1996) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a
(2003)).
153. Jeanine B., 967 F. Supp. at 1115.
154. Id.
155. See generally Montalvo v. Borkovec, 467 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
156. See generally id. at 419.
157. Id. at421.
158. Id. (citing In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992)).
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life; rather, it 'allows the disease to take its natural course." ' 1" 59 Also, "[t]he
state does not deprive an individual of life by failing to ensure that every
possible technological medical procedure will be used to maintain that
life.' 60 The Wisconsin Supreme Court limited the state's interest because
"[a]n unqualified state interest in preserving life irrespective of... the
patient's best interests transforms human beings into unwilling prisoners of
medical technology."'161  Additionally, "this interest [in preserving life]
weakens as the degree of bodily intrusion increases and the chance of
recovery wanes."1 62 The court indicated that death may be preferable than
continued life dependent upon technology, stating that "[a] dignified and
natural death may outweigh the interest of maintaining a physiological life
as long as medically possible."'163  Finally, the court made a strong
statement that affirmed withholding or withdrawing treatment as a viable
option: "We conclude that in some circumstances it may well be in the
patient's best interests to have treatment withheld or withdrawn."
' 64
Rather than mandating treatment, as the Court held in Montalvo, it is
more likely that, prior to this opinion, a parent's decision to forego life-
sustaining treatment at the child's birth or later in the child's life would
have been supported, as long as a thoughtful and careful best interests
analysis was conducted in concert with healthcare professionals and in
consideration of burdens imposed on and suffering experienced by the
child.
2. Concerns for Physicians' "Damned" Status
Regarding its second policy point, the Montalvo Court reasoned that "[i]f
treating physicians can be sued for failing to resuscitate a baby they feel is
not viable, and for resuscitating a viable baby such as Emanuel, they are
159. In re L. W., 482 N.W.2d at 71 (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J.
1985)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 74.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 68.
164. Id. at 68. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics,
Guidelines on Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, Pediatrics, 93 PEDIATRICS 532
(1994) [hereinafter Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment] ("Sometimes limiting or
stopping life support seems most appropriate, especially if treatment only preserves
biological existence or if the overall goal of therapy has shifted to the maintenance of
comfort."); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT 215 (U.S. Government Printing Office 1983) ("Public policy should
resist state intrusion into family decision making unless serious issues are at stake and the
intrusion is likely to achieve better outcomes without undue liabilities.").
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placed in a continuing 'damned' status."' 65 The Court compared its case to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Burks v. St. Joseph's
Hospital.166 This comparison is misleading. The Burks decision addressed
the specific issue of whether the Patients Compensation Fund was required
to provide coverage for violations of the federal Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA); 67 the merits of the
EMTALA claim were not addressed. 68 The legal analysis for an EMTALA
claim 169 and an informed consent claim 170 are quite different. Furthermore,
individual physicians were not sued in Burks.171 Even if they had been,
merely being named as a defendant in a lawsuit is not conclusive of
wrongdoing or negligence on the part of that defendant.
Moreover, physicians' professional and moral statuses are compromised
if the law requires that well-established professional standards and ethics be
ignored as in Montalvo. The legal precedent set in Montalvo does not allow
for the option of treatment withdrawal in the course of care for an infant
unless that infant is in a persistent vegetative state. 172 This law conflicts
with professional standards, which allow for treatment withdrawal if the
parents and care providers believe this decision to be in the child's best
interests, even if the patient is not in a persistent vegetative state. 173
Finally, the conflict between the law set in Montalvo and professional
standards may leave healthcare providers in a quandary over how to
practice. For example, one hospital in Wisconsin acknowledged this
conflict on its website and encouraged its physicians to practice in
accordance with the patient's interests and long-established ethical and
legal standards. 1
74
3. Variations in Parental Determinations
In its last public policy point, the Appellate Court discussed its potential
role in determining whether some persons with disabilities are allowed to
165. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413, 421 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
166. Id.; Burks v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 596 N.W.2d 391 (Wis. 1999).
167. Burks, 596 N.W.2d at 392.
168. Id. at 402.
169. Id. at 394-95 (discussing the legal analysis of an EMTALA claim).
170. See Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d at 417 (discussing the informed consent framework).
171. Burks, 596 N.W.2d at 392 (dealing with a complaint filed against the hospital and
the Wisconsin Patient Compensation Fund).
172. Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d at 419.
173. See generally Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, supra note 164, at 532-
36; see also Critically Ill Infants, supra note 143, at 149-52.
174. W.J. Hisgen & Ralph V. Topinka, Patient Center Advance Medical Directives
Discussion of Two Recent Wisconsin Court Cases, "Edna M.F." and "Montalvo" (Apr. 23,
2003), http://www.meriter.com/mhs/patient-center/dircases.htm.
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live and others allowed to die. 75 "[C]ourts will be required to decide which
potential imperfections or disabilities are no .. . 'worse than death.' .. . One
set of parents may view a particular disability as 'worse than death,' while
another set of parents would not."
17 6
This determination is not as arbitrary as the court suggested. The
situations in which parents ponder these decisions do not arise from
"imperfections" or minor disabilities; they arise when profound physical
devastation and suffering are very real probabilities for their child despite
the best of medical care and use of the most advanced technology. 177 These
decisions are a struggle for parents and healthcare professionals, not
theoretical queries.
7 8
There are no clear answers in these situations, and that is precisely why
no bright line should be drawn to require treatment absent a persistent
vegetative state in children. 79 Each situation is unique, with variables in
prognosis and parental perspectives; each situation deserves careful, fact-
intensive consideration by those involved in the care of the child.
This country has long recognized the right of parents to raise their
children in different ways, including making different decisions regarding
medical treatment.1 80 "That some parents 'may at times be acting against
the interests of their children' . . . creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a
reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that
parents generally do act in the child's best interests.' 81  It is precisely
because the "right" course of action is unclear that we defer to parents'
judgments. Social safeguards exist, not only in professional standards for
nurses and physicians, but also in mandatory reporting laws including those
for withholding of treatment. 82  Additionally, well-functioning ethics
committees and other professionals can assist parents in making these types
175. See Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d at 421.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Critically Ill Infants, supra note 143, at 151 ("[C]ontroversy still rages
about the appropriate limits, if any, to place on the treatment of extremely low birth weight
and premature infants, about infants with hypoplastic left heart syndrome, about children
with chromosomal abnormalities with known very limited life spans, about infants with
complex congenital abnormalities, and about children in the final states of terminal cancer or
other fatal chronic disorders.").
178. See id. ("Physicians should recommend the provision or foregoing of critical care
services based on the projected benefits and burdens of treatment, recognizing that parents
may perceive and value these benefits and burdens differently from medical professionals.").
179. See generally In re Jane Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992) (parents disagreed between
themselves as to the best treatment decision for their child).
180. See Susan D. Hawkins, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in
Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2075, 2080-82 (1996).
181. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (quoting Bartley v. Kremens, 402
F.Supp. 1039, 1047-48 (E.D. Pa. 1975)).
182. WIs. STAT. § 48.981 (2006).
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of decisions.1 83 The CAPTA regulations cited by the Court and interpreted
by Wisconsin's DHFS acknowledge the important role of parents in
decision-making for children, and especially for those with severe
disabilities. 184 The decisions and viewpoints of those who love and provide
daily care for the child should carry greater weight than those of the courts
or others who merely observe or read about the child whose treatment is in
question. 185
E. Another Consideration: Best Interests of the Child
Another potential implication of the Montalvo decision is the Appellate
Court's apparent disregard for any consideration of the "best interests" of
the child.186 Fundamental to any discussion about medical decision-making
for children is the question of "what is in the best interests of the child?'
187
The answer should involve a careful discussion of the benefits and burdens
of treatment and encompass not only the physical, but also the emotional,
social, and spiritual effects of a particular treatment decision on a child.
"The best interests standard protects another's well-being by assessing risks
and benefits of various treatments and alternatives to treatment, by
considering pain and suffering, and by evaluating restoration or loss of
functioning."''
88
The Montalvo Court failed to provide any semblance of a "best interests"
analysis for Emanuel. 189 Instead, the Court referenced best interests as if it
183. See generally, e.g., Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, supra note 164
(discussing elements in decisions to forgo life-sustaining medical treatment).
184. See GUIDELINES, supra note 141, at 7 (acknowledging the devastation parents of a
disabled, pre-term, genetically impaired, or at risk infant can feel, encouraging close physical
and emotional contact between the parent(s) and the infant, and advocating for shielding the
parents from additional stress).
185. See Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, supra note 164, at 532, 533
(recognizing the primacy of parental decision-making by the American Academy of
Pediatrics); see generally LAINIE FRIEDMAN Ross, CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND HEALTH CARE
DECISION MAKING (John Harris & Soren Ho eds., Oxford University Press 1998) (examining
healthcare decision-making for children).
186. See Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413,421 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
187. The best interests standard originated in child custody disputes. See Daniel B.
Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison of the State's Parens Patriae Authority
and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Children and Incompetent
Patients, 7 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 283, 291 (1991).
188. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
102 (Oxford University Press 2001) (1979) ("Under the best interests standard, a surrogate
decision maker must determine the highest net benefit among the available options,
assigning different weights to interests the patient has in each option and discounting or
subtracting inherent risks or costs.").
189. See generally Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d at 419 n.4 (citing lalfelice v. Zarafu, 534
A.2d 417, 418 (N.J. 1987), which also did not provide an evaluation of a child's best
interests, but where a child was four weeks old and nothing in the record suggested that the
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were a uniform standard applicable to all circumstances.1 90 It merely stated,
"Thus, in Wisconsin, in the absence of a persistent vegetative state, the right
of a parent to withhold life-sustaining treatment from a child does not
exist."1 91 In this proverbial stroke of the pen, the Court of Appeals may
have unwittingly abolished the best interests standard of decision-making
for children without providing a more meaningful standard.1
92
As discussed earlier, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in both In re L. W.
and In re Edna M.F. provided thorough "best interests" analyses for their
respective plaintiffs. 193 For the pediatric population, the objective factors as
articulated by the In re L. W. court are compounded by additional factors
related to the burden of treatment: Will loving parents or individuals care
for the child? Will the child be able to flourish to the best of her/his ability?
Will the child suffer in daily cares or routines? Will the child respond and
relate to others? Can the child be cared for at home in a loving environment
or will s/he be confined to a hospital for the likely remainder of her/his life?
It is also troubling that the plaintiff parents in Montalvo were not arguing
that they had the right to determine what was in their son's best interests.
The plaintiffs appeared more concerned with their right to make medical
decisions for Emanuel rather than their right or status as being the most
appropriate persons, legally and ethically, to determine his best interests. In
the absence of harm to their son, it is difficult to comprehend the basis for
this litigation. The Montalvo plaintiff parents later published an article in
which their discussion seemed to express more concern over the impact of
Emanuel's birth and life on the quality of their lives, rather than on any
suffering or hardships that Emanuel experienced or would experience, or on
his perceived quality of life. 194 In that article, the parents explained:
We feel that we have been subjected to a medical assault, an assault that
has devastated our lives .... Our dreams of a decent and normal family
physician should have been able to foretell the full extent of the infant's disability).
190. See generally id. at 419-21; see also Hurst, supra note 57, at 160-61 (discussing
abandonment of best interests standard by Wisconsin courts).
191. Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d at 419.
192. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 188, at 102-03 (providing a general
overview of a "best interests" as a standard for medical decision-making for children); Ross,
supra note 185, at 43 (discussing decision-making for children and proposing a revision to
the "best interests" standard); Hamann, supra note 79, at 117-19 (describing how the "best
interests" standard is flawed because it is not objective); Douglas S. Diekema, Parental
Refusals of Medical Treatment: The Harm Principle as Threshold for State Intervention, 25
THEORETICAL MED. 243, 246 (2004) (noting that a "best interests" standard does not help the
courts decide whose conception of the child's best interest should prevail).
193. In re Guardianship & Protective Placement of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 490-92
(Wis. 1997); In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 76 (Wis. 1992).
194. See generally Nancy Montalvo & Brian P. Vila, Parents Grand Rounds Speech on
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit Experience, 7 J. OF PERINATOLOGY 525 (1999).
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life are gone .... Emanuel's compromised survival has also drastically
altered our relationships with our former friends and family members...
. We and our son will never experience many of these things. Instead, we
will experience the desolation of watching from the sidelines as our
neighbors' children attain these milestones, knowing they will be
permanently out of our reach.' 95
It is important to remember that, in language and inference, children are not
chattel, and decisions made on their behalf should be for their benefit and
overall well being, not for the primary benefit of their parents. 1
96
Medical ethics policies and guidelines related to decision-making for
children, including the withdrawal or withholding of medical treatment, do
not distinguish between children in persistent vegetative state and those
with other diagnoses. 197  A mandate of treatment for children without a
diagnosis of persistent vegetative state clearly contradicts well-established
medical ethical policies and guidelines. Wisconsin's DHFS has recognized
that a best interests analysis is fact specific and that it is not always clear-
cut because the ability to help more infants live means that some infants
may be harmed in the process of attempting to help them.198 In some cases,
the standard of doing what is in the "best interests of the child" has become
blurred in the face of medical technology that increases our capacity to keep
infants alive indefinitely.' 99 The American Academy of Pediatrics also has
recognized that these decisions are difficult and must incorporate
considerations of best interests for a child.200
The legal framework for complex medical treatment decisions involving
children and their parents must, at a minimum, start with a best interests
195. Id. at 526.
196. See Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, supra note 164, at 533 ("The
phrase 'quality of life' refers to the experience of life as viewed by the patient, i.e., how the
patient, not the parents or health care providers, perceives or evaluates his or her
existence."); see also E.F. Krug III, Law and Ethics at the Border of Viability, 26 J. OF
PERINATOLOGY 321, 322-23 (2006).
197. See, e.g., Critically Ill Infants, supra note 143, at 151 (discussing treatment options,
including withholding life-sustaining medical treatment, for newborns with a myriad of
issues, not only those in a persistent vegetative state).
198. GUIDELINES, supra note 141, at 9.
199. Id.
200. Critically Ill Infants, supra note 143, at 150 (advocating that parents and physicians
should make reasoned decisions together about critically ill infants considering treatment
alternatives). See American Medical Association, E-2.215 Treatment Decisions for
Seriously Ill Newborns (2005), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/8460.html (stating that it is not necessary to attain absolute or
near absolute prognostic certainty before life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn since this
goal is often unattainable and risks unnecessarily prolonging infant's suffering).
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analysis specific to the child and family in question, and it ideally would
incorporate values of compassion and care into the decision-making
process.
III. CONCLUSION
The Montalvo decision certainly gives credence to the oft-quoted phrase,
"Bad facts make bad law." Without alleging any harm, the parents sued the
physicians for a failure to obtain informed consent to provide emergency
care, and the Court summarily dismissed the claim without a careful
analysis of previous Wisconsin case law. The law, which had been
intended to apply to complex cases involving incompetent adult wards of
the state with court-appointed guardians, has been extended to include cases
involving parents and children. In effect, the Wisconsin Appellate Court
has created law that may conflict with ethical duties of healthcare providers
under some circumstances and that denies parents the ability to act in their
children's best interests.
In its dismissal of the Montalvo claim, the Appellate Court neglected to
consider the reality that children experience medical conditions where life-
sustaining treatment is not a benefit or where medical treatment causes pain,
further disability, or removes them from the care of loved ones. The Court
ignored the great difficulty that parents have in deciding whether to have
their child endure further treatment for questionable results and a potentially
burdensome future. As technology and medicine move swiftly into the
future, our courts must tread carefully into these areas, while remaining
mindful that their decisions are creating a legal landscape in which children
and families are living and pediatric healthcare professionals are providing
care.
[Vol. 16
28
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol16/iss2/5
